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s: A perspective and
Summary
This study deals with the following questions:
a. What development has taken place in the decision-making system used for the
Dutch defence budget in the period from 1951-1980?
b. What were the background, the characteristics and the course of an attempt to
introduce extensive changes in this decision-making system? How can the
failure of this attempt be explained? The example used here is the attempt to
introduce a system of program-budgeting in the Ministry of Defence in the
1970s.
The framework of this study corresponds with this definit ion of the problem. In
Part I, consisting of Chapters 2,3 and 4, the structure and development of the
decision-making system in relation to the defence budget is central. In Part II
(Chapters 5, 6 and 7), attention is paid to the attempt to introduce a system of
program-budgeting.
ln Chapter 2, the formulation of the defence budget is analysed from three
perspectives: the foreign political perspective, the domestic political perspective
and the institutional perspective. In the first two, the importance of foreign
polit ics, domestic polit ics, and economic factors and developments are em-
phasized. The institutional perspective considers the actors that participate in the
decision-making process. Some of the actors, given their institutional positions
and interests, will approach the budgeting process from a primarily foreign
political perspective. Then again, other actors will advocate an approach that is
oriented more toward domestic politics. What perpective will dominate is to a
large extent determined by the perceptions and power of those participating in it.
Chapter 2 ends with a conceptual model in which the three perspectives are
integrated.
Chapter 3 deals with the procedures for decision-making used in the Netherlands
from l95l-1980 for setting the defence budget. Between l95l-1974, spending
ceil ings set for a period of several years were used to determine the size of defence
budgets. The internal division of funds among the armed forces was determined
by a fixed factor. The characteristics of this ceiling system, the way in which it was
applied in practice and the increasing number of objections to it are discussed.
Further, the budgetary processes employed since 1975 are described. Most
attention is paid to the so-called Netherlands Defence Planning Process (NDPP)
introduced in the Ministry of Defence in 1978. The decision-making procedures of
the Ministry as applied to the defence budget form an integral part of this NDPP.
Because Dutch defence planning is closely associated with NATO planning, the
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connection between NDPP and the NATO planning process is explored.
The role of Parliament in decisions on the defence budget arises several times in
Chapters 2 and 3.
Chapter 4 studies in a more systematic manner the ability of Parliament to
influence decisions on the defence budget and in how far it has done so. As in the
previous chapter, the period under study is 1951-1980.
While Part I deals with the decision-making on the size and distribution of the
Dutch defence budget since 1951, the focus in Part II is on an attempt to change
that decision-making system. It concerns the effort made in the 1970s to introduce
a system of program-budgeting into the Dutch Ministry of Defence.
The idea of program-budgeting was borrowed at the beginning of the 1960s from
the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) implemented by the
American Defence Department (and, later, by other parts of the American
government).
As described in Chapter 3, during the late 1960s in the Netherlands, increasing
criticism was levelled at existing budgetary decision-making practices. Criticism
of the process of defence budgeting was primarily prompted by the difficult
financial situation in which defence policy found itself at the end of the 1960s. In
this period, a growing gap appeared between the financial consequences of the
planned military policy on the one hand and the budgetary resources which the
government and Parliament were willing to appropriate for defence on the other.
In addition, a lopsided growth had developed in the structure of defence
expenditure. Operating expenses, especially personnel costs, had risen relatively
steeply at the expense of the materiel budget. Extensive weapon procurement
programmes to which the Netherlands was committed through NATO threatened
to become unpayable. The uncontrollable course of defence spending was seen
from various sides as a threat to the future of Dutch defence and pressure was
applied to the Ministry of Defence to put its affairs in order.
Against this background, an official decision was made to institute a system of
program-budgeting. Program-budgeting was presented by its advocates as a
rational method by which to arrive at an optimal budget on the basis of
substantial policy considerations. It was meant to provide the Minister of Defence
a management tool with which to repair the (broken) relationship between
military planning and decisions on the defence budget. The negative consequences
of the opaque, incremental budget practices that had led to the uncontrolled
increase in defence spending would become a thing of the past after the
implementation of program-budgeting. Such was the expectation.
In practice, little came of the official intention to rationalise decision-making at
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1970s, the attempt to introduce it was becalmed and died a silent death.
Part II is devoted to the question of why this attempt to rationalise decision-
making on the defence budget ended in failure. In Chapter 5 a detour is made to
the US, where PPBS was first developed and employed. At the end of the 1960s,
the American PPBS was the model for the various attempts to rationalise
decision-making that were made in several Western European countries, in-
cluding the Netherlands. But it is not only its role as the model for the reform
attempt by the Dutch Ministry of Defence that makes it interesting. Insight into
the nature of the problems that PPBS encountered in the Pentagon can act as an
'eye opener'to fix attention on the factors that may also have caused the failure of
the attempt to introduce program-budgeting in the Netherlands. The fact that, in
contrast to the Dutch situation, an extensive literature exists concerning the
development, the implementation and the practice of PPBS in the Pentagon forms
an additional reason to include the experience of the American Defence
Department in this study.
The historical background and theoretical characteristics of PPBS are dealt with
in Chapter 5. Further, attention is paid to PPBS in the Pentagon as it should have
worked and as it actually worked. Finally, an explanation is offered for the
discrepancy between the theory of PPBS and the practice. This explanation points
to the importance of resistance in the defence establishment to PPBS motivated by
power polit ics.
Chapter ó presents several theoretical reflections on the problems that surrounded
PPBS in the United States. As an example of an economic-rational decision-
making model, PPBS rests on the theoretical presuppositions concerning the
functioning of governmental organisations of the rational decision-making
model. By i l luminating PPBS from two other perspectives on governmental
decision-making developed in public administration science, insight can be gained
into the reasons for the repeated failure of applications of economic-rational
models in a bureaucratic-political context.
In the last chapter,we return to the Dutch defence establishment in the 1970s and
the attempt to implement a system of program-budgeting there. The study
concentrates on the question of what factors led to the failure of this attempt to
rationalise decision-making on the defence budget. A distinction is made between
endogenous and exogenous factors.
Endogenous factors include the problems and obstacles that are directly related to
the effort of operationalising program-budgeting and integrating it into the
organisation. Dovetail ing with the theoretical exercise in Chapter 6, attention is
paid to the question of in how far the proposals for program-budgeting could
depend on support within the organisation and what'technical' problems the
construction and implementation of program-budgeting brought with it.
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In addition to these endogenous factors, attention is also paid to exogenous
factors. That is to say, the developments outside the direct context of the activities
surrounding program-budgeting, but which have influenced it.
Research along these lines exposed a number of obstacles that blocked the
progress of program-budgeting and which eventually led to the failure of this
attempted reform.
The causes of this failure can be grouped into three categories:
l. the complexity of the concept of program-budgeting;
2. lack of motivation, and resistance in the defence organisation;
3. developments in the environment.
The complexity of the concept of progrom-budgeting
Program-budgeting makes difficult demands on the manner in which the
organisation collects, organises and processes information. In practice, the
'technical' realisation of these demands appeared to create large problems. The
problems which developed relating to the development of two subsystems of
pÍogram-budgeting, namely a cost information system and a programme
structure are studied in this light.
Lack of motivation, and resistance in the defence organisation
The decision by the political leadership of the Ministry of Defence to implement
program-budgeting was not supported by the rest of the defence establishment.
With the aid of the organisational-process and bureaucratic-politics models
discussed in Chapter 6, the following causes for this lack of acceptance are
suggested.
Scepticism among the majority of defence officials about the technical feasibility
of such a complex concept as program-budgeting.
Resistance against program-budgeting due to power politics:
- the centralism of program-budgeting was seen by the armed forces as a threat
to their autonomy;
- program-budgeting made the defence policy process transparent. Under
program-budgeting funds would have been distributed according to the
demonstrable contribution of the various branches to the realisation of
defensive goals set higher up rather than on the basis of an arbitrary factor
determined in the past;
- Program-budgeting meant interfering with tried and true methods. The new
approach to the budgeting process undermined, among other things, the
position of officials accustomed to the routines and techniques of the
traditional budget process.
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establishment as the essence of the reform plans. They ignored the power political
aspect of the proposed reforms. In contrast, the attitudes and behaviour of the
various groups and people from the civil and military bureaucracies involved were
determined by the expectations they had about the strengthening or weakening of
their positions and influence as a result of the proposed implementation of
program-budgeting.
Lack of support for program-budgeting within the defence establishment worked
against the realisation of the plans for reform. The strategy followed by the
Committee for Program-budgeting (a gradual, step by step approach with
participation by the parties involved), which had aimed for broader support
within the organisation to mobilise the reform process, did not achieve the desired
result. On the contrary, because of this strategy, progress was dependent on the
cooperation of groups whose interests were not served by the proposed system of
program-budgeting.
The continuing resistance to program-budgeting was translated into resistance
against the analyses of objectives as well as against the cost information system.
The result was that activities relating to both of these subsystems quickly
developed a life of their own, which led to their connection with program-
budgeting being pushed further and further into the background.
Developments in the Environment
a. Changes in planning
Program-budgeting is a product of the economic-rationalistic approach to
planning. At the end of the 1960s, expectations were high for the applicability
of this approach, in political and official circles as well as in the scientific
literature. Partly because of the disappointing results of the approach abroad
(PPBS in the United States) and in the Netherlands (namely, the activities of the
COBA), a reconsideration of the theoretical assumptions of this method of
government decision-making took place in the literature.
Criticism of the 'orthodox' concept of planning on which program-budgeting
was based led to growing scepticism about the desirability and possibility of
introducing such a system in a government organisation. This change in the
intellectual climate weakened the arguments put forward by the proponents of
program-budgeting and strengthened the position of those who, for various
reasons, objected to the introduction of this system.
b. Progrom-budgeting in the shadow of the reorganisation process
There is a great deal of overlap between the starting points and objectives of
program-budgeting and changes in the upper levels of the defence structure,
which were initiated at the same time. There was no attempt to coordinate both
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attempts at reform. They each had their own organisational embedment and
dynamic. The priority given to the reorganisation was at the expense of the abil ity
to implement a system of program-budgeting. First, because carrying out the
reorganisation required a great deal of energy from the leadership, which was
detrimental to their involvement in and support for the attempt to introduce
program-budgeting. An essential condition for the success of an extensive reform
programme, continuing support from the polit ical leadership, wes withheld
because of the priority given to the reorganisation. Second, because of this
reorganisation, a certain fatigue arose in the defence establishment which drained
its potential for change. Aspirations for the desired functioning of the defence
organisation were accommodated to the results achieved. Implementation of
program-budgeting was no longer considered urgent and was dropped from the
aeenda.
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